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233 
AGAINST LGBT EXCEPTIONALISM IN 
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION OBLIGATIONS 
CARLOS A. BALL* 
 Nelson Tebbe’s Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is 
a wonderful book.1 At a time when our country seems so 
polarized on so many social issues, it is a breath of fresh air to 
read a book that so thoughtfully grapples with the question of 
how best to protect religious freedom in our current age of 
equality.  Whether or not one agrees with Tebbe on 
methodological, policy, or normative questions, it is clear that he 
takes both religious freedom and egalitarian values seriously.  
Many of us in the legal academy who write on these issues tend 
to be on one side or the other of that divide, but Tebbe straddles 
the line, and he does so beautifully and effectively in this book.  
Not only does he take the arguments of both sides seriously, but 
even more importantly, I think both sides have until now taken 
Tebbe’s scholarship on the intersection of religious freedom and 
egalitarian values seriously, and that will only deepen with the 
publication of this book.2 This is a major contribution to the 
literature that will be discussed and analyzed for years to come. 
 There are many specific aspects of the book that merit 
praise.  For example, Tebbe deserves credit for grappling 
extensively with the question of third-party harms.  As Tebbe 
 
*Distinguished Professor of Law and Judge Frederick Lacey Scholar, Rutgers Law School. 
I elaborate on several of the points that I make in this essay in CARLOS A. BALL, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY (2017). 
1 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017). 
2 See generally Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 363 (2015) (noting examples of Tebbe’s earlier scholarship on the intersection of 
religious freedom and egalitarian values); Paul Horwitz & Nelson Tebbe, Religious 
Institutionalism—Why Now?, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 207 (Micah 
Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016); Nelson Tebbe, Religious Accommodation in the Age of 
Civil Rights: Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (2015).  
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explains, the avoidance of significant third-party harms must be 
an essential component of determining the proper scope of 
religious exemptions, whether constitutionally mandated or 
legislatively determined, in order to make sure that the 
government is not in a position of imposing significant costs on 
some resulting from the religious exercise by others.3 The 
question of third-party harms arising from religious exemptions 
has not traditionally received much attention from either courts 
or commentators, in part because many of the exemptions at 
issue in the past, such as those involving the smoking of peyote 
for religious reasons (e.g., Employment Division v. Smith)4 or 
waivers from compulsory education requirements (e.g., Wisconsin 
v. Yoder),5 did not impose significant harms on identifiable third 
parties.  The same cannot be said, as Tebbe persuasively argues, 
about the exemption at issue in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc.6 
The fact that the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby interpreted the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to require that a 
contraception exemption be granted to closely-held corporations 
controlled by religious owners made it significantly more difficult 
for large numbers of women (composed of the corporations’ 
female employees and the female dependents of employees) to 
have access to contraceptives in the months following the ruling.7 
This makes the exemption at issue in Hobby Lobby much more 
problematic than the exemptions at issue in Smith and Yoder.  I 
agree with Tebbe that it is essential to keep questions of third-
party harms in mind when considering the proper scope of 
religious exemptions from LGBT antidiscrimination laws.8 
 
3 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 52-54.  
4 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that denying unemployment 
compensation to persons who had used peyote for sacramental purposes did not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause). 
5 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin’s compulsory 
school-attendance laws unduly burdened the Free Exercise Clause rights of Amish 
parents). 
6 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
7 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 51.  
8 I discuss the issue of third-party harms and religious exemptions in CARLOS A. BALL, 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY 266-70 (2017) and 
Carlos A. Ball, Sexuality, Third-Party Harms, and the “Live-and-Let-Live” Approach to 
Religious Exemptions, LAW, CULTURE & HUMANITIES, Aug. 24, 2015, at 1. For other 
writings on the question of third-party harms and religious exemptions, see, e.g., 
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the 
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Tebbe’s treatment of the crucial third-party harm question is just 
one of the many ways in which he rigorously and thoughtfully 
grapples with the intersection of equality and religious freedom 
in the book.  
 Traditionally, participants in book symposia such as this 
one praise first and criticize second.  The latter part of this 
equation is challenging for me because I essentially agree with 
much of what Tebbe has to say in the book.  However, I want to 
make an overarching observation about the book, related to the 
relative importance of historically-based judgments in Tebbe’s 
project.  I also want to suggest that, given his methodological 
approach in the book, Tebbe is too quick to dismiss the analogy 
between racial discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination in the context of religious exemptions.9 
  I am struck by the crucial—I could even say 
determinative—role that past resolutions of conflicts involving 
religious exemptions play in Tebbe’s approach to resolving 
current controversies involving religious liberty on the one hand 
and LGBT rights and reproductive freedom on the other.  Tebbe’s 
social coherence approach follows a two-part process in seeking to 
resolve the contemporary controversies at issue.  First, it 
analogizes from concrete, past controversies.10 Second, it 
abstracts normative principles from past cases.11 Either way, 
under the social coherence approach that Tebbe defends in the 
book, participants in the debates, as he puts it, “are likely to rely 
on commitments that they have come to trust.”12 
 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 343, 363-68 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible 
Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 
67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 52-56 (2014); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, 
Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1377-
80 (2016). 
9 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 131 (suggesting that when considering how to exempt 
religious individuals from LGBT antidiscrimination laws in the context of marriage 
equality, “it might be best to put the race analogy aside”).  
10 Id. at 8 (explaining that the social coherence method calls for comparing “a new 
scenario . . . to familiar situations and to conclusions they have drawn about them after 
careful consideration”).   
11 Id. at 8-9 (explaining that the social coherence method also relies on “principles, 
meaning tenets . . . abstracted from particular cases [that are then applied] to the new 
situation”). 
12 Id. at 9.  
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In my estimation, Tebbe is correct that contested legal and 
policy questions arising from the intersection of religious freedom 
and equality principles demand difficult normative work.  But, 
after reading the book, I am not sure he realizes the extent to 
which his social coherence approach is historically driven.  
Whether through analogies from concrete, past cases or by 
abstracting normative principles from past cases, Tebbe is 
essentially looking at how the country has, in the past, 
accommodated religious freedom in the pursuit of other 
objectives to guide us through current religious liberty 
controversies involving LGBT rights and reproductive freedom. 
 I think Tebbe does a wonderful job in abstracting 
compelling and normatively defensible principles from the 
nation’s past experiences with religious exemptions, including 
the importance of avoiding significant third-party harms.  At its 
core, I understand Tebbe’s project to be one of historically-
grounded judgments, many of which are imbued with normative 
principles.  It seems clear from the book that Tebbe thinks his 
project is more normative than historical.13 But I think the 
project’s normativity is inextricably linked to its historical 
methodology. 
 It is easy to overlook (or forget)—as our society grapples, in 
particular, with contemporary controversies pitting LGBT 
equality against the rights of speech, association, and to the free 
exercise of religion of those who oppose that equality—that our 
nation through the decades has repeatedly dealt with difficult 
questions related to how best to balance the equality rights of 
some against the liberty interests of others.  Indeed, the 
contemporary disputes over the proper scope of the state’s 
authority to promote LGBT equality in the face of liberty-based 
objections are only the latest iterations of a continuing debate in 
American law and policy over the reach of antidiscrimination 
laws. 
 In my view, a policy setting approach in this area that 
looks to history for guidance is the correct one, which is 
essentially why I agree with much of what Tebbe has to say in 
 
13 See id. at 8-9 (describing the social coherence approach as calling for the reaching 
of judgments and the application of principles). 
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the book.  In contrast, it seems to me that behind the call for 
expansive religious exemptions in the context of LGBT equality 
that go beyond the scope of past religious accommodations is the 
notion of “same-sex marriage exceptionalism,” that is the 
contention that marriage equality presents us with novel 
questions about the intersection of religious freedom and the 
scope of antidiscrimination laws that demand new forms of 
religious exemptions from the application of antidiscrimination 
laws—such as, for example, immunity from the application of 
antidiscrimination laws benefitting for-profit corporations and 
government employees.  
 I believe we should reject the notion of LGBT rights 
exceptionalism, including that which is applicable to marriage 
equality issues.  It is true that the particulars of the 
contemporary debates over the intersection of LGBT rights and 
liberty claims are relatively new; the tension between equality 
and liberty in the context of LGBT rights could not arise when 
there were no legal protections for sexual minorities.  Sexual 
orientation antidiscrimination laws are of relatively recent 
vintage, and therefore the conflict between religious liberty and 
LGBT equality is also of relatively recent vintage.  But even if 
the particulars are relatively new, the broader question of how to 
enforce antidiscrimination laws while accommodating liberty-
based interests is an old and recurring one in American history.  
Our country has grappled with the liberty-based limits to the 
application of antidiscrimination laws at many different times, 
including during the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1875;14 
during the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;15 during 
the controversy, in the early 1980s, involving the question of 
whether particular religious educational institutions were 
entitled to tax breaks despite their race-based policies;16 during 
the 1980s and 1990s, as the courts grappled with the application 
of gender antidiscrimination laws to all-male organizations;17 
 
14 See BALL, supra note 8, at 156-60.  
15 See id. at 169-171, 173-74, 179. 
16 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579 (1983). 
17 See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 4 (1988); Bd. of 
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 539 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984). 
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and during the last forty years as the courts have developed and 
implemented the constitutionally-based ministerial exception to 
antidiscrimination laws.18  
 Given the country’s extensive experience grappling with 
the proper contours of liberty-based limits—including those 
grounded in religious freedom—to the application of 
antidiscrimination laws, there is no need, in my view, for new 
and expansive accommodations that depart significantly from the 
ways in which the nation has in the past accommodated liberty 
considerations while seeking to attain equality objectives in the 
context of race and gender.  
 I recognize that there is a certain irony in the fact that an 
LGBT egalitarian such as myself is calling for the use of history 
as a guide for the resolution of current LGBT controversies given 
that it has been LGBT rights opponents, of course, who have 
repeatedly relied on historical traditions and practices to deny 
LGBT equality claims, including those related to marriage.  But 
that history has been one of male and heterosexual privilege and 
exclusion.  That is a history, in other words, that is morally 
suspect. 
 But the history of how American antidiscrimination law 
has sought to accommodate religious liberty is not normatively 
suspect.  In fact, I think our country has reached time-tested, 
reasonable, and workable compromises arising from the 
intersection of race and gender equality, on the one hand, and 
religious freedom, on the other hand; generally speaking, how the 
nation’s laws have accommodated religious freedom in the 
pursuit of racial and gender equality has worked well for all 
sides. 
 Well-established exemptions, such as the ministerial 
exemption and the religious exemptions to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, have provided important protections to 
religious groups by allowing them, in some contexts, to pursue 
their spiritual missions without having to abide by 
 
18 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171, 176-77 (2012); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999); McClure v. 
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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antidiscrimination obligations applicable to other entities.19 At 
the same time, the well-established religious exemptions have 
not interfered, to any significant degree, with the ability of 
antidiscrimination laws to achieve their objectives.  The ways in 
which our country, through the decades, has balanced the 
pursuit of equality for marginalized groups against the religious 
freedom rights of equality opponents constitute time-tested, 
reasonable, and workable compromises that we should use as 
guides in addressing contemporary disputes arising from the 
tension between the attainment of LGBT equality and the 
protection of religious freedom.  
 At the end of the day, there is no good reason, in the 
context of LGBT issues, to depart in significant ways from how 
anti-discrimination law has in the past accommodated religious 
dissenters in the context of race and gender.  I am therefore not 
so quick, as Tebbe does in his book, to put the race analogy aside 
in grappling with the question of how broad religious exemptions 
should be in the area of sexual orientation equality.20 
 Supporters of expansive religious exemptions in the 
context of LGBT rights often take offense when egalitarians 
argue that religious exemptions in the context of sexual 
orientation should not be significantly broader than those in the 
context of race—race is different, they insist, because essentially 
all religious actors who believe it is proper to make racial 
distinctions always act in bad faith (i.e., they are racists).21 On 
 
19 For the Supreme Court’s elucidation of the ministerial exception, see Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89. The religious exemptions to Title VII are found in 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-1(a) (“This title shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a 
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”) and in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e)(2) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, 
or other educational institution . . . to hire and employ employees of a particular religion 
if such . . . institution . . . is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, 
or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or 
society . . . .”).  
20 See TEBBE, supra note 1, at 131. 
21 For example, Thomas Berg argues that those who, in earlier times, dissented on 
religious grounds “from basic racial equality . . . showed an intransigence that bespoke a 
permanent dismissal of African-Americans as full humans.” Thomas C. Berg, What Same-
Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
206, 235 (2010). 
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the other hand, it is argued, many of those who, on conscience 
grounds, believe it is proper to make distinctions on the basis of 
sexual orientation, in particular when it comes to marriage, act 
in good faith (i.e., they are not homophobic).22 Another variation 
of this argument is that while reasonable people can still 
disagree on the appropriateness of same-sex marriage bans, no 
reasonable person can disagree on the appropriateness of anti-
miscegenation laws.  This is essentially Kent Greenawalt’s 
argument for treating religious exemptions differently in the 
context of the legal recognition of interracial marriages than 
similar exemptions in the context of same-sex marriages, a 
contention that Tebbe notes in his book.23 
 The problem with these efforts to distinguish between 
religious dissent from LGBT equality and religious dissent from 
racial equality is that they contain unavoidable assessments of 
the reasonableness of the two sets of religious views.  It seems to 
me that efforts to distinguish religious-based objections to LGBT 
equality from religious-based objections to race equality—in 
 
22 It is argued that religious dissenters from marriage equality act in good faith 
because “[t]here is a serious debate about the relationship of sexuality and procreation to 
marriage, and about the relevance of the ‘centuries of tradition—of accumulated social 
knowledge—which the world’s great religions embody’ and which almost uniformly has 
treated marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman.” Id. (quoting JONATHAN 
RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR 
AMERICA 165 (2004)). For her part, Robin Fretwell Wilson claims that 
[w]hile the parallels between racial discrimination and discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation should not be dismissed, it is not clear that the two 
are equivalent in this context. The religious and moral convictions that motivate 
objectors to refuse to facilitate same-sex marriage simply cannot be marshaled to 
justify racial discrimination. 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the 
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS 77, 101 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson 
eds., 2008).  It is also contended that “[s]ometimes the[] refusals of service [to LGBT 
people] may be an act of bigotry or social protest, but very often, the claim to feel personal 
moral responsibility, or even fear of divine punishment, will be in complete good faith.” 
Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS 189, 195 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson 
eds., 2008). 
23 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 131. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims 
of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91, 114 (2013) (arguing that, unlike with interracial 
marriage bans, there is still no consensus on the unreasonableness of same-sex marriage 
bans, and that therefore “it will take some time before that perspective is shared by the 
vast majority of citizens and is no longer a subject on which people are seriously divided. 
[As a result], some accommodation may properly be given in the meantime for those not 
yet able to perceive the moral truth of the matter”). 
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order to justify broader religious exemptions in the sexuality 
context—fail from the beginning because they are grounded in 
the notion that some religious views are more reasonable than 
others.  Even if exemption proponents are correct in their belief 
that many religious opponents of LGBT equality act in good 
faith, it is extremely problematic to set policies, including 
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws, on 
ostensible distinctions between reasonable and unreasonable 
religious views.24 
 Indeed, it is difficult for outsiders to determine the degree 
of good faith with which individuals assert religious claims.  Such 
a determination usually requires intrusive inquiries into the 
nature of and justifications for particular religious values, 
inquiries made even more problematic by the fact that religious 
beliefs are by their nature grounded in considerations of faith 
rather than in those of reason.  As a result, courts are 
appropriately hesitant to scrutinize either the sincerity of 
religious litigants or the reasonableness of their views.25 
  In short, unlike Tebbe, I do not think we should put the 
race analogy aside when determining the proper scope of 
religious exemptions from LGBT equality measures.  Instead, the 
burden should be on those who want to treat LGBT equality 
differently from racial (or gender) equality when it comes to 
religious exemptions to explain why that differential treatment is 
justified, and claims based on the good faith of those who object 
 
24 See generally Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV. 
639 (2016) (where I further explore questions related to good faith and bigotry in same-
sex marriage debates).  
25 For example, although the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University rejected the 
university’s contention that its religious-based understandings of racial equality 
precluded the government from withdrawing tax benefits because of the institution’s race-
based policies, it accepted the proposition that the university had “a genuine belief that 
the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage.” Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574, 602 n.28 (1983); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (“The 
religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to 
most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding 
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. 
When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.”). As Ira Lupu 
notes, “the inquiry into sincerity cannot completely escape the distinctly bad aroma of an 
inquisition. The decisionmaker can rarely be morally certain that the claimant is 
not sincere in his professed religious commitments.” Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The 
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 954 (1989).  
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to the application of LGBT equality mandates on religious 
grounds simply do not cut it.  
 It bears emphasizing that to argue in favor of treating 
religious exemptions from sexual orientation antidiscrimination 
obligations in generally similar ways as our country’s laws have 
treated religious exemptions in the context of race and gender 
antidiscrimination obligations is not to argue in favor of 
absolutist egalitarian positions in these matters.  As 
demonstrated by our nation’s historical treatment of religious 
liberty as it impacts the pursuit of racial and gender equality, the 
question is not whether exemptions should be provided; instead, 
the question is the extent of their scope. 
 In reviewing that history elsewhere, I have identified five 
characteristics of the ways in which American antidiscrimination 
law, before the advent of same-sex marriage, sought to 
accommodate religious dissent while pursuing equality 
objectives.   
 First, the exemptions have granted religious organizations 
some accommodations from antidiscrimination obligations that 
go beyond what is constitutionally required.  Second, the 
exemptions have generally distinguished between the discretion 
of religious organizations to make distinctions on the basis of 
religion and their ability to take other protected traits, such as 
race and gender, into account.  Third, the exemptions have 
applied to a broad category of religious organizations, not just to 
houses of worship.  Fourth, the exemptions have been limited to 
nonprofit religious organizations [and thus have not been made 
available to for-profit entities].  Finally, the exemptions have not 
allowed government officials to decide which members of the 
public to serve based on the officials’ religious views.26   
 Policymakers and citizens, in assessing contemporary 
controversies over the state’s authority to promote LGBT 
equality, should look to these traditional ways in which American 
antidiscrimination law has sought to balance equality and 
religious freedom.27 It is true, of course, that the mere fact that 
American antidiscrimination law has traditionally granted 
 
26 BALL, supra note 8, at 251. 
27 See id. at 263. 
BALL (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2018  10:48 AM 
2018 AGAINST LGBT EXEPTIONALISM FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION 243 
 
religious accommodations that go beyond what is constitutionally 
required; distinguished between the ability to hire coreligionists 
and the discretion to take other protected traits into account; 
allowed a broad category of religious organizations to benefit 
from exemptions and not just houses of worship; limited the 
beneficiaries of those accommodations to nonprofit entities; and 
refused to exempt religious government employees from 
antidiscrimination obligations does not conclusively establish, as 
a normative matter, that the same should apply to religious 
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws in all circumstances, 
including those involving sexual minorities.28 Nevertheless, these 
time-tested characteristics of exemptions from antidiscrimination 
obligations create a strong presumption that they should be 
followed in determining the scope of exemptions in matters 
related to LGBT rights.  
 This means that if a proponent of LGBT equality contends 
that religious exemptions from sexual orientation 
antidiscrimination laws should be narrower than the exemptions 
that legislatures have granted religious dissenters in the past in 
matters related to race and gender—for example, by not 
extending exemptions beyond those that are constitutionally 
required or by limiting the beneficiaries of those exemptions to 
houses of worship, to the exclusion of other types of religious 
organizations—the proponent should have the burden of showing 
why LGBT equality should be treated differently from other 
forms of equality.29 
 Similarly, if an opponent of LGBT equality contends that 
religious exemptions from sexual orientation antidiscrimination 
laws should be broader than the exemptions that legislatures 
have granted religious dissenters in the past in matters related 
to race and gender—for example, by making religious exemptions 
available to for-profit entities or to government employees—the 
burden should be on the opponent to show why LGBT equality 
should be treated differently from other forms of equality.30 As 
Alan Brownstein aptly puts it, “the contention that religious 
 
28 See id. at 263-64. 
29 See id. at 264. 
30 See id. 
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objectors to same-sex marriage must receive special 
accommodations beyond those that would be provided to others 
in comparable circumstances raises questions about 
preferentialism and equity that need to be addressed and 
resolved.”31 In short, if there is going to be LGBT rights 
exceptionalism when it comes to the scope of religious 
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws, the burden should be 
on proponents of that exceptionalism to establish why it is 
required.32 
 The clash between equality and liberty is a recurring issue 
in the history of American antidiscrimination law, rendering the 
ongoing debates over the intersection of LGBT equality and 
religious freedom neither exceptional nor surprising.  The 
nation’s history shows that it has been possible in the past to 
reach workable compromises between the pursuit of equality for 
marginalized groups and the protection of important liberty 
interests enjoyed by opponents of that equality.  
 Any such compromise, whether legislatively crafted (as in 
Title VII) or judicially mandated (as in the ministerial exception), 
can be criticized for being too narrow or too broad.  Nonetheless, 
the generally reasonable compromises that legislatures and 
courts have implemented in this area have had two distinct 
benefits.  First, they have helped to calm the waters, so to speak, 
by reducing the social and political conflict that accompanies the 
initial, and seemingly inevitable, clash between equality and 
liberty in the application of American antidiscrimination law.  
Second, most of the compromises have provided important 
protections to religious organizations without significantly 
interfering with the government’s efforts to eradicate racial and 
gender discrimination.33 This historical record provides grounds 
for optimism that the nation will be able to reach reasonable and 
workable compromises on how best to balance equality and 
liberty in the context of LGBT rights that, although not 
 
31 Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for 
Reciprocal Accommodations of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to 
Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 410 (2010). 
32 See BALL, supra note 8, at 264. 
33 See id. at 178-80 (discussing the compromise that led to the final language of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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satisfying the concerns of advocates on all sides, end up being 
generally accepted as fair and appropriate. 
 I agree with Chad Flanders when he emphasizes, in his 
contribution to this symposium, the normative and pragmatic 
importance of compromise in this area of law and policy.34 Of 
course, to emphasize the importance of compromise is not to 
endorse the merits of any particular compromise.  However, I 
agree that, as a general matter, participants on both sides of 
contemporary debates over the extent to which considerations of 
religious liberty should limit the scope of LGBT equality 
measures would be well served by engaging in those debates in 
the spirit of compromise.  
 At the same time, the determination of which compromises 
are ultimately unacceptable to each side because they violate 
first principles requires unavoidable reliance on normative 
assessments and judgments.  Tebbe is therefore undoubtedly 
correct that the resolution of difficult normative questions is an 
indispensable component of determining how to resolve ongoing 
controversies implicating the intersection of religious freedom 
and egalitarian values.  At the same time, as Tebbe’s 
methodology also shows, the question of what constitute 
reasonable resolutions to contemporary clashes between religious 
liberty and the pursuit of egalitarian objectives can and should 
be guided by defensible normative principles that emerge from 
how our country has attempted to resolve those clashes in the 
past.  In other words, there is no need to reinvent the exemption 
wheel.  The bottom line is this: we should be suspicious of the 
contention that the push for LGBT rights, in particular as it 
relates to marriage equality, constitutes a unique threat to 
religious liberty that requires significant departures from the 
ways in which American antidiscrimination law has 
accommodated religious liberty in the past. 
 
 
34 Chad Flanders, In (Partial) Praise of (Some) Compromise: Comments on Tebbe, __ 
J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2, 13-15) (on file with the Journal 
of Civil Rights and Economic Development). 
